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LOOPHOLE LEGISLATION-STATE CAMPAIGN
FINANCE LAIS
It has been said that "the purification of politics is an iridescent
dream." 1 This pessimistic view aptly describes the multitude of state
laws that attempt to regulate the solicitation, collection and disburse-
ment of money in political campaigns.2 Historically, state regulation
of political finance began in 1883 with a New York statute prohibiting
the solicitation of contributions from state employees. In 1890, the
Empire State broadened its regulatory scheme with legislation requir-
ing the filing of sworn financial statements by candidates. In 1893,
California commenced regulation of political committees, established
a list of legitimate campaign expenses and limited the amount of
money that might be spent on behalf of a candidate.3  By 1905 four-
teen states had some sort of campaign finance regulation,4 and today
only seven states are without extensive legislation in the area.5
The extent of regulation varies among jurisdictions. South
Carolina, for example, only requires the candidate to promise that
he has not and will not use alcoholic beverages to influence voters
and that he will render an account of the funds expended in the
campaign.6 At the opposite end of the spectrum are states like Min-
nesota and Florida which have comprehensive statutory schemes regu-
lating the amount and type of contributions and expenditures, imposing
controls on the financial management of the campaign, and providing
for the disclosure of the sources of contributions and the purpose of
the expenditures.7 Although most states have some regulation, few
have regulatory machinery which is effective and comprehensive.
I John J. Ingalls, cited in BA~RmTr, QUOTATIONS 607 (1949).
2 The federal campaign finance laws are not evaluated in this Comment because
of extensive coverage elsewhere. See generally, Alexander, Money, Politics and
Public Reporting, in STuDIES IN MONEY AND POLITICS (1965); HEARD, THE COSTS
OF Dmocl.Acy 355-59 (1960) ; Bicks & Friedman, Regulation of Federal Election
Finance: A Case of Misguided Morality, 28 N.Y.U.L. REv. 975 (1953); Note, 66
HA~v. L. REv. 1259 (1953).
3 ALEXANDER & DENNY, REGULATION OF POLITICAL FINANCE 5 (1966).
4 OVERAcKER, MONEY IN ELECTIONS 289-97 (1932).
5 Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Nevada and Rhode Island. Four
of these states have some regulation in the field. ALAsKA STAT. §§ 15.55.010-.020
(1962) (corrupt practices); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-724, 22-9902 (1966) (limiting
corporate contributions); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 132 (Smith-Hurd 1944) (liquor
dealers forbidden to make contributions); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-1481 to -1496
(1950) (prohibitions on corporate contributions) and §§ 18-1531 to -1534 (1950) (cam-
paign literature). For legislation in the other forty-three jurisdictions, see note 23
infra.
6 S.C. CODE § 23-265 (Supp. 1966).
7 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.161 (Supp. 1966); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 211.01-.39
(1962), as amended, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 211.02-.39 (Supp. 1966).
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Campaign finance laws are typical of attempts by politicians to regulate
their own affairs, and, although the statutes create the impression
that regulation has been attempted, they all too often embody carefully
drafted loopholes which drain them of any substance.
I. A SURVEY OF THE STATUTES
A. Limitation of Campaign Expenditures
One of the more common statutory schemes attempts to limit
the amount' that may be spent in a campaign. Twenty-nine states 9
have such limitations, fixed either as a dollar amount,10 a percentage
of the salary of the office being sought," or a percentage of the
vote in the last election.'2 Preliminarily, it is questionable whether
setting an arbitrary limit on the amount which may be spent in a
campaign is feasible or wise; 13 but, assuming that such a limit
is an appropriate means by which to regulate campaign finance, the
fact is that the statutory limits which now exist are riddled with loop-
holes and exceptions. Typically, the statutes exclude certain costs from
consideration. Most states exclude traveling and lodging expenses.1
4
Some states except the cost of postage, stationery and telephone serv-
ice.15 And in three states the ceiling regulations are totally emasculated
8 For limitations on types of disbursements, see notes 51 & 52 infra and accom-
panying text.
9 ALA. CODE tit. 17, § 272 (1958) ; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-426 (Supp. 1966);
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-1303 to -1401 (1947) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-337 (1966);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-619 (1963); IND. ANN. STAT. § 29-5705 (1949); IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 56.7 (1949), 56.8 (Supp. 1966); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-903 (1964);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 218 (Supp. 1966) ; MicH. STAT. ANN. § 6.1902 (Supp. 1965);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211.06 (Supp. 1966); MISS. CODE ANN. § 3180 (1957); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 129.100 (1966); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-1427 (1947); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 70:4 (Supp. 1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:39-1 (1964); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 3-10-8 (1953), 3-11-30 (Supp. 1965) ; N.Y. PEN. LAW § 781; N.D. REv.
CODE §§ 16-20-02 to -03 (1960) ; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.08(B) (Page Supp.
1966) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 414 (Supp. 1966) ; ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 260.040-.050
(1957); S.D. CODE § 16.2005 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. §§2-211 (Supp. 1966),
2-212 (1955); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 493 (Supp. 1965) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 24-402
(Supp. 1966); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-8-10 (1966) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 12.20 (1967) ;
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 22-347 (1957).
10 See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 29-5705 (1949) ($25,000 for a statewide election) ;
MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 218 (Supp. 1966) ($20,000 for a statewide election).
" See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 56.7 (1949), 56.8 (Supp. 1966) (50% of salary
of the office sought) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-903 (1964) (10% of the salary
of the office sought).
12 See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 129.100 (1966). Note that if the ceiling is computed
on the basis of the number of votes cast for a party, it will discriminate against the
minority party by allowing it less funds than the dominant party may receive. See
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-337 (1966) (ten dollars per 1000 voters who voted at
last preceding election for candidate of same party for same office) ; VA. CODE ANN.
§ 24-402 (Supp. 1966) (fifty cents for each vote cast for candidate of his party receiv-
ing the largest number of votes).
13 See notes 107-11 infra and accompanying text.
14E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 3-1303 (1947); N.J. STAT. ANN. §19:39-1 (1964).
15 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-339 (1966); N.Y. ELECTiON LAW § 322(3).
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by exclusion of the major cost item of any campaign-radio, television
and newspaper advertising."
More often than not the ceilings on expenditures are rendered
ineffective by means more subtle than mere exceptions. In Arizona,
Idaho, Vermont and Virginia, the limitations only apply to spending
in the primary election, leaving the general election unregulated.' In
several states the ceilings affect only what the candidate himself
spends,'" leaving political committees and groups unhampered by any
restrictions. Others make the candidate responsible for limiting his
own expenses and the amounts he knows are being spent on his behalf. 9
While the latter is seemingly a stricter standard, it can be avoided by
keeping the candidate ignorant of the sources of his financial support.
In summary, the loopholes and omissions render all but six state
statutes ineffective, 0 by eliminating some major item, covering candi-
dates but not committees, or covering primaries but not general
elections.
B. Disclosure Statutes
The second major legislative weapon used to control abuses in
political financing is compulsory disclosure of amounts contributed
and expended during the campaign. The purpose of these statutes is
to expose to the public all of the financial transactions of politicians,2'
as well as the sources of their funds. Such statutes are premised on the
belief that an aware public will not vote for a candidate who has partici-
pated in questionable financial transactions, or who is tied to dis-
16ALA. CODE tit. 17, § 272 (1958) (newspaper and radio advertising exempt);
ARiz. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 16-426 (Supp. 1966); VA. CODE ANN. § 24-402 (Supp. 1966).
Maryland recently revised its law to include the amount spent for radio and television.
Compare MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, §218(b) (1957) with MD. ANN. CODE art. 33,
§218 (Supp. 1966).
1
7 Aniz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-426 (Supp. 1966); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-619
(1963); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 493 (Supp. 1965) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 24-402 (Supp.
1966). It should be noted that in states dominated by one party, as in the South,
only regulation of the primary election would be an effective means of controlling most
campaign activity.
18 ALA. CODE tit. 17, § 272 (1958); ARE. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-1303, -1401 (1947);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 3180 (1957) ; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.08 (B) (Page Supp.
1966).
19 See, e.g., N.D. REv. CODE §§ 16-20-02, -03 (1960) ; ORE. Rv. STAT. §§ 260.040-
.050 (1957) ; S.D. CODE § 16.2005 (1939).
20 IND. ANN. STAT. § 29-5705 (1949) ;MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 218(c) (Supp.
1966); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 211.06-25 (1962), as amended, MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 211.06-.25 (Supp. 1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 129.100 (1966) ; N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 19:39-1 to :39-2 (1964) ; N.Y. PENAL LAw § 781. These states all have well drafted
limitations on campaign spending. Whether the imposition of such limitations is wise
as a matter of policy, is discussed at notes 107-11 infra and accompanying text.
21 The scope of transactions to which the statutes address themselves and to
which the discussion in this Comment will be limited, comprehends only the receipt
and disbursement of funds raised to further the candidacy of the politician, and does
not include transactions common to all persons. Thus, unless campaign funds are
involved, the financing of a home or of a college education need not be disclosed.
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reputable interests.22 In general, these laws require the candidate or
his campaign manager (and sometimes the treasurers of political com-
mittees) to submit reports to certain state officials, setting forth each
contribution and disbursement, the name of each donor and the purpose
of each expenditure."
Forty-three states require some disclosure of political finance. 4
Unfortunately, these statutes are often futile exercises in form-filing
endured by politicians only because they give the appearance of self-
regulation. The most glaring deficiency in these laws is that they
do not require enough data. To reflect accurately campaign contribu-
tions and expenditures, all persons or groups collecting and spending
money for political purposes should be required to report their financial
dealings during the primary and general election campaigns.25 Yet
eight state statutes apply only to candidates, 26 one state regulates
only committees,27 and, of these nine states, only five require the
22Some countries regard political contributions as a private matter and do not
have any disclosure statutes. HEARD, THE COSTS OF D ocRAcy 355-56 (1960).
.2See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3227 (a) (Supp. 1966). For a copy of the
form on which these reports are filed see MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 223A (Supp. 1966).24 ALA. CODE tit. 17, §§278-80 (Supp. 1965); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-423
to 25, -451 to 55 (1956) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-1303, -1313 (1947) ; CALF. ELECTIONS
CODE §§1503, 11560-69; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §49-21-51 (1963); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 9-338 (Supp. 1966), 9-341 (1960) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 99.161(8)-(15)
(Supp. 1966); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 11-78 (1955) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-620 (1963) ;
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 29-5703 to -5704, -5707 to -5708 (Supp. 1966) ; IowA CODE ANN.
§§ 56.1 (Supp. 1966), 56.2-56.6 (1949); K-AN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-901, -904
(1964); Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 123.086, .091 (Supp. 1967); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 21,
§ 1397 (1964); MD. ANN. CODEart. 33, §§213(c), 214(b), 216, 223 (Supp. 1966);
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 55, § 16 (1964); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 6.1906 (Supp. 1965);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211.20 (Supp. 1966); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 3179, 3181 (1957);
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 129.110, .230 (1966) ; MoNr. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 94-1430 to -1431
(1947); NEB. Rr~v. STAT. §§ 32-1102 to -1103, -1120 to -1121 (1960); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 70:5-:8 (Supp. 1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:44-1 to :44-2 (1964);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-10-9, -14 (1953); N.Y. ELECTION LAW §§ 321-24; N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 163-193 to -195 (1964); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16-20-04 (1960); OHIO Rv.
CODE ANN. § 3517.10 (Page Supp. 1960) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 402, 406 (1955),
416 (Supp. 1966); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 260.060-.080 (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25,
§ 3227(a) (Supp. 1966); S.C. CODE § 23-265 (Supp. 1966); S.D. CODE §§ 16.2007-.2008
(1939) ; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 2-2101, -2104, -2106 (1955); TEX. REV. ELECTION CODE
ANN. art. 14.08 (1967) ; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 20-14-9 to -10 (1953) ; VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17, §§491-92 (1959); VA. CODE ANN. §24-442 (1964); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 29.18.140 (1965); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-8-5 (1966); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 12.09
(1957) ; Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§22-348 to -350 (1957).
25 Elected officials have often used their position to extract "contributions" in
return for political favors. See generally MAYORs AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON IMPROVE-
MENT IN MUNICIPAL STANDARDS AND PRACTICE, FINAL REPORT 17-19 (Phila., Pa.
1962). Although this form of extortion and bribery is properly a concern of the
criminal law, it should be noted that practices of this nature can be combatted by
periodic disclosure by all committees, cf. 43 Stat. 1071 (1925), 2 U.S.C. § 244(a)
(1964), and by yearly disclosure of each elected official's income and expenditures.
Unfortunately, present law only provides for disclosure during the campaigns. See
note 24 .rpra.
2 6 ARE. STAT. ANN. § 3-1313 (1947) (see also § 3-1303 (1947), which requires
those who have put a measure to a vote of the people, to file a report) ; IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 34-620 (1963); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 3179, 3181 (1957); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 16-20-04 (1960) ; S.C. CODE § 23-265 (Supp. 1966) ; Vr. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 491
(1959); VA. CODE ANN. §24-442 (1964); WASH. REV. CODE §29.18.140 (1965).
2 7 ALA. CODE tit. 17, § 278 (Supp. 1965) (candidate regulated indirectly because
required to name committees to handle his financial transactions and committee must
file reports).
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reporting of expenditures in the primary.28 Among the states that
require reports by both candidates and committees for both the primary
and general election, fifteen fail to provide standard forms.29  Con-
sequently, the number of accounting systems displayed in the reports
is limited only by the number and imagination of the candidates. To
complicate matters further, six states require only disbursements to be
listed,3 ° leaving undisclosed the names of the donors and the amount
the candidate received but did not spend.
As a result of the loopholes listed above, at least one-third of the
states have defective disclosure statutes. Despite these deficiencies,
however, the laws do have some value. They expose certain aspects
of political finance and give some idea of a candidate's financial sup-
port. Unfortunately, the financial reports fail to accomplish their
main objective-effectively informing the voter-because most of the
laws require the reports to be filed after the election.3 Deadlines for
filing vary from ten " to forty-five days after the election.33 Regardless
of the accuracy of the information contained therein, reports are
obviously going to have little impact on the voters if they must wait
until a candidate runs for re-election to register their disapproval.
Although once filed the reports are technically public property,84
in practice, they are often protected from inspection by the statutes
that require them and by the bureaucracy that receives them. In In-
28 Arkansas, Idaho, Mississippi, Vermont and Washington have statutes that only
apply to primary elections. See note 24 supra.
29The reporting statutes in Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Missouri,
New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington and Wyoming do not require standard reporting forms. ALEx-
ANDER & DENNY, REGULATION OF POLITICAL FINANCE Table 1 at 55 (1966).
3 0 ARx. STAT. ANN. § 3-1313 (1947) ; HAWAII Rsv. LAWS § 11-78 (1955) ; TENN.
CODE ANN. § 2-2101 (1955) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit 17, § 491 (1959) ; VA. CODE ANN.
§24-442 (1964); WAsH. REV. CODE §29.18.140 (1965).
31 Eighteen states require some reports to be filed before a primary or general
election. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.161(8) (a), (9) (a) (Supp. 1966); Ky. REv. STAT.
§ 123.086 (Supp. 1967); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 21, § 1397(2) (1965); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 33, § 223(a) (Supp. 1966); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 55, § 16(d) (1964);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §211.20(4) (Supp. 1966); MIss. CODE ANN. §3179 (1957)
(applies only to contributions to candidates); NEB. REv. STAT. §32-1120 (1960)
(applies only to treasurers of political committees); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§70:5-:6, :8 (Supp. 1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. §19:44-1 (1964); N.Y. ELECTION
LAW §323(1)(a); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§163-193, -195 (1964); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 23-265 (Supp. 1966) (applies only to candidates) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-2101 (1955)
(applies only to candidates); Tax. REV. ELECTION STAT. ANN. art. 14.08(b), (c)
(1966); UTAH CODE ANN. §20-14-9 (1953); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-8-5 (1966);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 12.09(1) (Supp. 1966).
32 See, e.g., MicH. STAT. ANN. § 6.1906 (Supp. 1965) (ten days after the primary).
33 See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 29-5707 to 08 (Supp. 1966) (45 days after the
election) ; OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 35-17.10 (Page 1960) (same). Thus the reports
for a November election in these states would be filed between December 16th and
22d. It seems that the holiday season would not be the most opportune time to insure
widespread dissemination of the information contained in the reports.
34The reports are available for inspection for varying periods. See, e.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. REv. § 9-342 (1967) (15 months) ; Ky. REV. STAT. § 123.101 (Supp. 1967)
(10 years); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-10-15 (1954) (1 year).
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diana, Michigan and Missouri, the law requires the reports to be filed
where the candidate resides," which results in some campaign finance
statements being filed in obscure places. In most states the reports
are filed with other elected officials, 6 a situation which insures neither
the enforcement of the laws nor the accessibility of the reports.
7
Tennessee's technique for insuring that the reports for the primary
elections receive "adequate" exposure is to compel their filing with
the executive committee of the candidate's party.38  Only two states
have assumed that most voters will not go to the filing office and
inspect the statements. Oregon and Kentucky have legislation which
requires that a summary of each candidate's and committee's state-
ments be published. 9 It is indeed significant that the one technique
which insures that the disclosure statutes will fulfill their avowed
purpose has been so consistently avoided.
Only Kentucky and Maine have legislation authorizing a special
body to examine, audit and investigate the financial transactions listed in
the reports.4 Both are five-man committees, drawn from the two
major parties in a manner which insures minority party representa-
tion.4' In Maine, the Campaign Reports Committee is composed
of two members from the state senate and three from the state house
of representatives, who are appointed by the presiding officers of the
respective houses.42 The committee is authorized to meet before and
after the election to review all campaign reports ' and to fine or dis-
qualify those who have failed to file. 4 The committee may also investi-
gate the financial transactions of candidates and political committees
either upon its own initiative or upon request by the voters.4 Although
the committee has functioned well,4 it does have some shortcomings,
the most obvious one being that the members of the committee are
3 5
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 29-5707 to 08 (Supp. 1966); Micn. STAT. ANN. § 6.1906
(Supp. 1965); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 129.110, .230 (1966) (candidate files with the
official who issues the certificate of election and where he resides).
3 6 Typically the filing officer is the Secretary of State. See, e.g., N.Y. ELECTION
LAW §324; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §3228 (1963).
37 For one researcher's experience in gaining access to the federal campaign
reports, see HEARD, THE COSTS OF DEmoCRACY 965 (1960).
3 8 TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-2103 (1955).
39 Ky. REv. STAT. § 123.061(g) (Supp. 1967) ; ORE. REV. STAT. § 260.120 (1965).
See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-6-18 (1953) (municipal officials required to publicize
their expenditures). Maine repealed its publication law in 1961. See ALEXANDER &
DENNY, REGULATION OF POLITICAL FINANCE 9 (1966).
40 KY. REv. STAT. §§ 123.055, .061(2) (i)-(j) (Supp. 1967) ; ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
ch. 21, §§ 1399-1401 (1965).
41 Both statutes require that at least two of the five members be of the minority
party. Ky. REv. STAT. § 123.055(2) (Supp. 1967); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 21,
§ 1399 (1965).
42 
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 21, § 1399 (1965).
43 
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 21, § 1400(1) (1965).
4 4 
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 21, § 1398 (1965).
45 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 21, § 1401 (1965).
4 6 See ALEXANDER & DENNY, REGULATION or PO.ITICAL FINANCE 14 (1966).
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legislators, who not only are subject to partisan pressure but also
are the same people who are to be regulated.
The Kentucky approach to the problem is somewhat different.
The five-man Registry of Political Finance is appointed by the governor
-two from each major political party and the chairman from a list
submitted by the other four members.4" Although a majority of the
registry will probably have the same political affiliation as the governor,
it is an independent agency of the state4" with its own permanent
staff.49 It thus does not suffer from the defect of its Maine counterpart
-legislators do not enforce the laws against their elected colleagues.
Furthermore, the registry is empowered to develop regulations for
the filing of campaign reports, to publish appropriate forms, to distribute
a summary of each report, and to investigate violations of the dis-
closure laws. The Kentucky legislation also authorizes the registry
to receive all campaign reports, to register all political committees, and
to develop internal financial controls over contributions received and
disbursements paid out by political committees. 0 With the exception
of Maine and Kentucky, no states have made any serious attempt to
make their disclosure statutes effective.
C. Internal Financial Controls
Along with ceilings on spending and disclosure statutes, the states
have developed several other financial controls. By far the most
common are those which centralize responsibility for handling the
candidate's financial transactions during the campaign. Such statutes
insure that there will be a responsible agent who will use standard
accounting methods and controls, maintain accurate records and comply
with the disclosure statutes. Typically this type of statute requires
the candidate or political committee to name a treasurer 5' who is to
receive all contributions and authorize all disbursements.52 Thus all
funds are accounted for and revealed to the public through the dis-
closure statutes.
To guide the treasurer in making disbursements, over one-half of
the states limit the type of expenditures to those authorized by statute.3
In general they permit expenditures for advertising, clerical help,
telephones and the other normal expenses of running a campaign,1
4
so that they do not, in fact, limit the candidate in spending his money.
47 ICY. REv. STAT. § 123.055 (2)- (6) (Supp. 1967).
8KM. REv. STAT. §123.055(1) (Supp. 1967).
49 Ky. REV. STAT. § 123.061 (1) (Supp. 1967).
50 K-Y. RE . STAT. § 123.081 (Supp. 1967).
5' See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.161(3) (a) (1960) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 29-5703
(Supp. 1966); MicE. STAT. ANN. § 6.1903 (1956); PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 25, § 3222
(1963).
Zi2 ee, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 21, § 1394 (1965); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 3-10-12 (1954).5 3 
See generally, Ky. LEGisLATIVE REsEAizcH COMm., REGULATioN OF CAMPAIGN
CONTRIBUTIONS, App. A (1966).
64 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 9-340 (Supp. 1967).
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To insure that all funds are accounted for, this type of legislation
often requires anyone who receives a contribution in the name of the
candidate to report it to the treasurer.55 Furthermore, the number of
persons authorized to handle the funds is limited by statutes which
require the candidate to designate in writing his political agents.5 To
provide accurate information about the sources of political finance, there
is often legislation requiring the treasurer to note the names and
addresses of all contributors and the purpose of all expenditures."
Likewise, anonymous contributions are generally forbidden."8 Finally,
a few states make the debts incurred by political committees and can-
didates unenforceable unless presented within a few days after the
election ' in order to force creditors to present their bills quickly so
that an early and accurate picture of the liabilities of the candidate or
the committee is available.
Despite the variety of legislation on the subject, financial controls
are limited in their application, easy to avoid and generally ineffective.
The present statutes attempt to accomplish their purpose by centralizing
responsibility for financial matters in a few officials and by requiring
that accurate records be kept. The major defect in this approach is
that the responsibility for these duties rests exclusively on partisan
campaign officials who are often tempted to avoid the law in their
quest for an election victory. Four states have recognized this, and
now require the candidate to name a bank as the official depository
of his campaign funds." The treasurer is required to deposit all
contributions in the bank within a short time after receipt, and all
deposits are to be accompanied by slips showing the name and address
of the contributor and the amount donated. Likewise, withdrawals
are permitted only upon written authorization, which shows the
purpose of the expenditure and to whom the money will be paid.6'
55 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §16-404 (1956); N.Y. ELECrION LAW §327; S.D.
CODE § 16.2009 (1939).
56See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. §9-335 (Supp. 1967); IND. ANN. STAT.
§29-5702 (Supp. 1966).
Z7 See, e.g., Apiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-402(c) (1956) (notation of purpose not
required); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 129.220 (1966); NEB. REv. STAT. §23-1118 (1960).
Some states require receipts for all contributions or disbursements, e.g., ARiz. Rxv.
STAT. ANN. § 16-403 (1956), and others require written authorizations before making
disbursements. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.161(7) (1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3223
(1963).
58E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 123.065(4), .095 (Supp. 1967); MD. ANN. CoDE art.
33, § 222(c) (Supp. 1966); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 55, § 8 (1964); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 25, § 3227(c) (1963).
5 CAL. EL.crIONs CODE §§ 11620-31; UTAH CoDE ANN. § 20-14-8 (1953).
Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:43-1 to -3 (1964).
6FLA. STAT. AiN. §§ 99.161 (3) (a), (3) (b), (5)-(7) (1960) ; Ky. REv. STAT.
§ 123.071 (Supp. 1967); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 55, § 17 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 19:40-1, :41-2, :42-1, :42-2, :44-5 (1964).
, 1 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.161 (7) (1960) ; Ky. REv. STAT. § 123.081 (Supp. 1967);
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 55, §§ 17(b)-(c) (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:41-2, :42-2
(1964).
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These deposit and withdrawal slips are retained by the depository and,
along with a statement of the account, are forwarded to the appropriate
filing official.
6 2
Requiring the candidate to use a depository has obvious advan-
tages. It forces him to provide the bank with some information in order
to use its facilities, and these records, kept by non-partisan officials,
provide a check on the other statements filed by the candidate. How-
ever, there are also disadvantages-the depository does not provide
any information about strictly cash transactions, and the information
on the deposit and withdrawal slips is only as complete as the treasurer
makes it. The depository laws have been further hobbled by drafting
loopholes. In some states the laws apply only to some candidates and
generally not to all committees.' Despite these deficiencies, the use
of the depository promises to be the best mechanism to achieve some
effective regulation of the internal financial management of a political
campaign.
D. Limitations on Contributions and Solicitation
State regulatory schemes usually include statutes designed to
reduce the impact of certain vested interests on political campaigns and
finances. In this group are statutes which prohibit or limit contribu-
tions by corporations, labor unions " or individuals.' Conversely,
there are laws designed to reduce the impact of politics on certain
groups. Hence, candidates and committees in many states may not
solicit contributions from state employees.0 6 Likewise, in many states
62 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.161(10) (1960) (15 days after the election); Ky. Rxv.
STAT. § 123.091 (Supp. 1967) (same); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 55, § 17(e) (1964)
(the 5th and 20th day of each month during the account's existence).
63 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.161(3) (a) (1960) (candidate for office in the state);
KY. RE-V. STAT. § 123.071 (Supp. 1967) (each candidate in an election) ; MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 55, § 17(a) (1964) (statewide offices, federal offices, treasurer of state
political committees and committees authorized by the candidate); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 19:40-1 (1964) (the governor, United States Senators and Representatives).
6 4
See, e.g., MicH. STAT. ANN. § 6.1919 (1956); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211.27
(1962); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3225 (1963), all of Which prohibit contributions
by corporations. IN. ANN. STAT. § 29-5712 (1949); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 70:2
(III) (Supp. 1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3225 (1963), all of which prohibit
contributions by labor unions.
The effectiveness of these statutes is arguable. Federal law has similar prohibi-
tions, but various union committees spent over $3,000,000 in the 1964 elections. Like-
wise, corporations avoided the prohibition through such devices as purchasing adver-
tising in the programs printed by the parties for their national conventions. 21 CONG.
Q. ALmANAC 1550, 1553-54 (1965). See generally, Bicks & Friedman, Regulation
of Federal Election Finance: A Case of Misguided Morality, 28 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 975,
992-96 (1953).
65 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.161(2) (a) (1960) ($1,000) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 33,
§ 219(b) (Supp. 1966) ($2,500) ; MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 55, § 6 (1964) ($3,000 each
to individuals, political parties and non-elected political committees); N.H. Rv.
STAT. ANN. § 70:2(V) (Supp. 1965) ($5,000) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-8-12(f) (1966)
(same).
66 See, e.g., Apac. STAT. ANN. § 3-1403 (1956) (state employees); OL REv.
STAT. § 260.230 (1965) (nonelected public office holder).
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charitable organizations may not solicit contributions from candidates. 7
This type of legislation enables politicians to ask for contributions
without being deluged with requests from various citizens to give
to their favorite charity.
E. Enforcement of the Laws
The fatal flaw in state campaign finance regulation is that the
lawmakers are regulating themselves. The temptation to protect one's
own and to avoid reprisals from the other party have produced some
fine examples of loophole legislation."8 Not only do some politicians
draft the laws, but other elected officials are required to enforce them.
A majority of the states have no specific enforcement machinery and
the election laws are enforced by the district attorney in the same
manner as other penal laws."9 Unfortunately, and perhaps not unex-
pectedly, elected officials seem noticeably reluctant to enforce the regu-
latory measures against their campaigning colleagues.70 This lack of
initiative among law enforcement officials has prompted over one-third
of the states to provide alternative means of enforcing their political
regulations.
7 '
A few states authorize private citizens to bring suit if the prosecut-
ing attorney fails to act.7' However, a more common type of legisla-
tion permits the voters, usually a minimum of five to ten, to petition
the courts for an investigation of alleged violations.7'  Some states
07 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 17, § 286 (1959) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211.07 (1962);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 3140 (1957) ; OHIO RV. CODE ANN. § 3517.09 (Page 1960).
08 See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 3182-85 (1956). Before there is a judicial
investigation of alleged violations in Mississippi, the plaintiff must file with the state
executive committee, and, if there is an unreasonable delay, he may then petition the
court to investigate, if two practicing attorneys will swear that the petition should
be granted. These procedural devices almost preclude enforcement of the law by
private action.
09 Cf. S.D. CODE § 16.2008 (1939).
70 Pettengill, Regulation of Campaign Finance, 19 MD. L. REv. 100 (1959)
Comment, 41 CALif. L. REv. 312 n.105 (1953). The Federal Corrupt Practices Act
also suffers from inadequate enforcement. In 1962, fifty-four candidates for Congress
failed to file the required statements, and the Justice Department would not prosecute
without a request from the House or Senate. 24 CONG. Q. 59 (1966).71 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.27(9) (Supp. 1966) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 29-5713 (Supp.
1966); Ky. Rxv. STAT. § 123.991(4) (Supp. 1967); MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 230
1957) ; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 55, §28 (1964) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211.33 (1962) ;
Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 3182-85 (1956) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 129.140-.190 (1966) ; MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. §§ 94-1433 to 35 (1949) ; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 70:16 (Supp. 1965) ;
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:29-1 (1964); N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 334; OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 3517.13 (Page 1960); ORE. Rxv. STAT. §§ 260.105-.110 (1965); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit 25, §§ 3231-32 (1963) ; TEx. REv. ELECTION CODE ANN. art. 14.09 (1967) ; UTAH
CODE ANN. § 20-14-40 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 24-407 (1964); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§12.22 (1957).
7 2 MINN. STAT ANN. § 211.33 (1962); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 129.160 (1966).
7 3 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.27(9) (Supp. 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. § 29-5713 (Supp.
1966); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 55, § 28 (1964); N.Y. ELEcTIoN LAW § 334; OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 3517.13 (Page 1960) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3231-32 (1963) ;
TEx. REv. ELECTioN CODE ANN. art. 14.09 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-14-40
(1953); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 12.22 (1957).
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require a preliminary hearing to determine the strength of the charge.
Further proceedings are not authorized unless strict standards of proof
are met. Thus, Massachusetts requires that there be a reasonable
belief that a corrupt practice has been committed which has materially
affected the results of the election.' Indiana law requires that the
interests of justice and the purpose of the law be served before per-
mitting further inquiry,75 while Utah and Wisconsin demand that there
be sufficient evidence that a proceeding under the law may be success-
fully maintained.7"
Once this hurdle is overcome, the case is accepted by the court
for investigation and disposition. Procedural practices vary among
the states. In Florida, after the court's jurisdiction is invoked, the
district attorney investigates. If violations are found, he begins litiga-
tion to unseat the elected official.77 In Pennsylvania the procedure is
initiated by a request for a judicial audit of the candidate's records.
If violations are uncovered, quo warranto proceedings are begun.
78
Regardless of the procedural differences, this type of legislation permits
the electors to bypass reluctant law enforcement officials and to call
into question the financial transactions of candidates. Unfortunately,
most citizens possess neither the resources nor the initiative to investi-
gate and initiate prosecutions against suspected violators.
Even if there are citizens who are both willing and able to vindi-
cate the public interest, violations of the political finance laws will not be
prosecuted unless these citizens are made aware of them. Along with
the disclosure laws discussed above, another means of uncovering
violations is implemented by statutes which require various state
officials to inspect all campaign reports for errors or misrepresenta-
tions. Typically the filing officer inspects the forms and notifies the
candidate of any errors. Failure to correct the defect within a short
time results in notification of the prosecuting attorney; legal action
follows.79 Unfortunately, the large number of reports to be examined
and the short time available 8 prevent the filing officer from discovering
74 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 55, §28(a) (1964).
75 IND. ANN. STAT. § 29-5713 (Supp. 1966).
70 UTAH CODE ANN. §20-14-40 (1953); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 12.22(2) (1957).
77 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.27(9) (Supp. 1966).
78 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §§ 3231-32 (1963).
Rather than invoking the court's power, Maine and Oregon require the complain-
ant to proceed before other elected officials. In Maine, he may petition the Campaign
Reports Committee to investigate the alleged violation, ML_ REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 21,
§ 1401(1) (1965), while in Oregon requests for investigations are begun by notifying
the filing officer, who then forwards them to the Secretary of State, who, in turn,
appoints the Attorney General to investigate the alleged misconduct, OaR. Rv. STAT.
§260.105 (1964).
79 See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 55, § 23 (1964); MoNT. REv. CODES ANN.
§ 94-1433 (1949); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-14-13 (1953).
SO Realistically, election day is a time limitation, for after that date prosecutions
against successful candidates are difficult politically, and there is little incentive to
pursue the losers. Some states allow the filing officer up to 60 days to report violations.
MASS. ANN. LAwS ch. 55, § 23 (1964); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-1433 (1949).
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more than the most obvious errors. Moreover, the statutes often limit
the scope of the examination. The broader laws authorize the filing
officer to ascertain whether the reports are filed, whether they conform
to the law and to examine the complaints filed by private citizens."'
However, three states permit the filing officer to report only a failure to
file the campaign reports; 8 the Board of Elections in Oklahoma
ascertains only whether the limits on expenditures have been exceeded.
3
These procedural and practical limitations on the filing officer preclude
an intensive study of the reports, and, consequently, the examinations
become only a check on the number of reports filed and the accuracy
of their arithmetic.
F. Sanctions
Finally there are the statutes which authorize various sanctions
for violations of the campaign finance laws. Typically these statutes
permit the imposition of one thousand dollar fines and prison terms
of one year. 4 A few states provide for cumulative fines for each
day's delay in filing the required campaign reports.8 5 Besides the
normal criminal penalties, many jurisdictions provide for forfeiture
of office if a violation is proved." Several states disqualify violators
from public office for varying periods," and a few states disenfranchise
them. 8 Likewise many jurisdictions will withhold a candidate's
name from the ballot if he is convicted before the election. 9 To insure
Suits brought by private individuals are often hampered by short statutes of limitations.
See, e.g., MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-1459 (1949) (40 days after election) ; N.D.
REv. CODE § 16-20-23 (1960) (same); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3231 (1963) (20 days
after the reports are filed).
81 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 55, §§ 23-24 (1964); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 6.1908 (1956);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-1433 (1949); UTAH CODE ANN. §20-14-13 (1953);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-352 to -353 (1959).
8 2
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §25-905 (1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-196(8)
(1964) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-8-7 (1966).
83 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 417 (1955).
8 4 See generally, ALEXANDER & DENNY, REGULATION OF POLITICAL FINANCE 64-65,
table 4 (1966).
85 CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 9-338 (1967) ($25 per day) ; ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
ch. 21, § 1398 (1965) ($5 per day) ; N.D. REv. CODE § 16-20-04 (1960) ($25 per day);
ORE. REv. STAT. § 260.060(2) (1965) (same).
8
6 ALA. CODE tit. 17, § 273 (1959); A~iz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-427 (1956);
ARK. STAT. ANN. §3-1401 (1956); CALIF. ELECTION CODE § 12054; IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 34-621 (1963); MD. ANN. CoDE art. 33, § 230(f) (1957); MASS. ANN. LAW ch. 55,
§ 28(g) (1964); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 129.180 (1966) ; MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-1458
(1949); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3232 (1963); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-14-42(1)
(1953).
8 7 KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-905 (1964) (disqualified from any public office
for 2 years); MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, §230(g) (1957) (disqualified from public or
appointive office for 4 years); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211.36 (Supp. 1966) (disqualified
from that office for its term) ; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3517.11 (Page Supp. 1966)
(5 or 7 years); OaK REv. STAT. § 260.470 (1965) (disqualified for term of that office).
8 8 See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 55, § 37 (1964) (3 years) ; PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 25, § 3552 (1963) (4 years).
8s9 See, e.g., MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-1455 (1949); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§ 411 (1955).
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that the disclosure statutes are obeyed, the filing of campaign reports
is often a condition precedent to assuming the duties of office, and,
perhaps more important, to receiving salary." Two states, California
and Texas, have taken the novel approach of making the candidates
civilly liable for violations of the law.9'
As with most of the legislation in the field, the problem with the
statutes imposing sanctions is not with the theory, although there are
some practical limitations, 2 but with the drafting of the statutes.
Perhaps the most blatant example is the high burden of proof required
by the statutes providing for forfeiture of office. Normally the candi-
date cannot be convicted if the offense was trivial,93 or if it did not
affect the outcome of the election.94 New Jersey allows the candidate
to disavow illegal transactions made by his supporters and thus escape
responsibility for them.9" While some restrictions are necessary to
avoid politically motivated harassment and to prevent elections from
being overturned needlessly for technical violations, the present statutes
unnecessarily emasculate the forfeiture sanctions.
As this survey indicates, present law is clearly inadequate. Revi-
sion is essential if the abuses of financial power are to be eliminated
from the political scene.
II. THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEMS
There is no doubt that the regulation of political finance today is
more loophole than legislation. At the same time, it is also true that
the means for providing effective regulation have been proposed, but
apathy has generally preserved the inadequacies of the present system.
A few states have overcome this, but inertia remains the biggest road-
block to reform.
In fairness to the legislators who grapple with these problems, it
must be noted that politics has inherent characteristics which make it
difficult to regulate. Political campaigns are basically struggles for
power through the mobilization of public opinion. The nature of
democracy, with its emphasis on convincing the individual voter, neces-
D0 Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 129.110, .130 (1966); NEB. REV. STAT. §32-1105 (1960);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3229 (1963); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-2107 (1955) (no
specific mention of salary) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-14-17 (1953).
91 CALn. EIrlErON CODE §§ 11890-91; TEx. ELECTION CODE ANN. art. 14.05
(1967). In both states the effectiveness of these statutes is limited. California only
provides for a $1000 recovery, which in many cases would not cover the expense of
bringing the suit. The Texas law limits the cause of action to each opposing candi-
date whose name shall appear on the ballot at the next election. For a proposal that
remedies some of these defects, see text accompanying notes 127-31 infra.
92 See discussion at the beginning of section II infra.
93 See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 29-5713 (Supp. 1966).
94 See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 55, § 28(e) (5) (1964).
95 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:3-8 (1964). The practice seems to be to file the dis-
avowal before the campaign begins and thus repudiate any illegal transactions before
they happen. Bottomley, Corrupt Practices in Political Campaigns, 30 B.U.L. REv.
331, 348 (1950).
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sarily generates pressures to reach the maximum number of voters
with one's message. Any legislation that impedes or attempts to
limit this drive will be unenforceable. Consider for example the statu-
tory limitations on the amount that may be spent in a campaign. Such
ceilings, if enforced, obviously restrict the number of people who will
be exposed to a candidate. Faced with the alternatives of not reaching
and thus failing to convince a majority of the voters, or violating the
limitations, candidates have always chosen the latter course.
The style of life in the mid-twentieth century also has an impact
on practical politics and its regulation. Although radio and television
enable candidates to reach all voters, it is difficult to make personal
contact with them. Both major political parties have attempted to
remedy this by organizing large numbers of people into various
committees to give them a sense of involvement in the campaign . "
This makes regulation more difficult because more people are handling
the money and there are more opportunities for evasion of the law;
violations are harder to uncover and substantiate when they are hidden
in a maze of transactions.
Perhaps the most frustrating problem in regulating political
finance lies in developing effective enforcement machinery that provides
appropriate sanctions for violations of the law. Most enforcement of
present law depends upon the initiative and discretion of local, elected
officials, who have a natural reluctance to bring suit against their
colleagues. There are also other practical problems that hamper
enforcement of the law. For example, candidates are unlikely to know
of violations and, in such cases, are not responsible for them under
present law . 7  Furthermore, the complexity and number of trans-
actions involved in a campaign serve to hide most of the misdeeds
committed by a candidate's supporters. The inability to document
violations by anonymous campaign helpers and the unwillingness to
hold candidates responsible for acts beyond their control, are two
further reasons why enforcement officials are unwilling to prosecute
violations. These difficulties are not inherent in the regulation of the
political process. They could be solved if there were more and better
means of controlling and disclosing the financial transactions of candi-
dates during campaigns.
The problem of developing appropriate sanctions is a complicated
one. The normal penalties are fine, imprisonment, exclusion of the
candidate's name from the ballot and forfeiture of office. 8 Unfor-
96 A classic scheme to create a sense of participation among voters involved the
use of 1800 volunteers, for whom no other work could be found, to send thank you
notes to 250,000 people who signed the candidate's nomination petition. WHrrE, THE
MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1960, 102-03 (1961). It has been claimed that this type of
personal involvement was crucial to Barry Goldwater's victory in the 1964 California
primary. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1964, 126-29 (1965).
O7 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 104.27(2), (7) (Supp. 1966).
98 See notes 84-91 supra and accompanying text.
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tunately, these penalties have inherent limitations. Fines, for example,
are generally small and can be considered a campaign expense by cynical
politicians. 9 Imprisonment may be imposed for many violations, but
the harshness of the measure and the prominence of the defendant
severely limit its use. Striking the name of the candidate from the
ballot is an effective punishment only in certain circumstances. Only
winning candidates, those who are required to file disclosure reports
before an election, and those actually prosecuted before an election
need fear the possibility of having their names deleted from the ballot.
Statutes providing for forfeiture of office upon conviction are hobbled
by poor drafting '00 and also by a limitation inherent in our represen-
tative system of government: the federal constitution and the constitu-
tions of the states provide that the legislatures shall be the sole judges
of their own elections."0 Consequently, some states have concluded
that they should not void the elections of Congressmen or their own
state legislators when they have been convicted of violating their laws.
Rather, these states inform the presiding officers of the respective
bodies and leave the disciplinary action to them.0 2 This approach
rejects any state responsibility for enforcing its own laws and leaves
it to individual citizens to contest the elections in the legislatures. On
the federal level, experience has shown that Congress is noticeably
reluctant to enforce the Federal Corrupt Practices Act against its own
19 The upper limit on fines is usually $1000. See generally, ALEXANDER & DENNY,
REGULATION OF POLITICAL FINANCE 64-67, table 4 (1966). But see TEX. ELECTION
CODE ANN. art 14.06 (1967) (maximum fine is $5000); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-9902
(1966) ($1000 or 10 times the illegal corporate contribution, whichever is higher).
Cumulative fines imposed for continued delay are often discretionary. CONN. GEN.
STAT. REV. § 9-338 (1967) ; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 21, § 1398 (1965).
100 See notes 93-94 supra and accompanying text.
101 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1; INDEX DIGEST OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 638
(2d ed. 1959). The right of a state legislature to judge its own elections is not
unlimited. A state legislature cannot exclude a duly elected member if such exclusion
violates a federally protected right. See Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
The current litigation by Adam Clayton Powell to regain his seat in Congress
will test whether the power of the House of Representatives to exclude a duly elected
individual is subject to judicial review. Unlike the Bond case, the Powell litigation
involves a confrontation between two co-equal branches of the federal government.
In the past the Court has avoided such conflict when it believed that a constitutional
decision should, more properly, be made by another branch of the federal government
or when assuming jurisdiction over the controversy would disturb the balance of
power among the three branches. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 456-60
(1939) (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black) (Congress, not the Court, has
sole power over amending the Constitution). See generally, Scharpf, Judicial Review
and the Political Question--A Functional Aialysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966). Thus,
even if Mr. Powell is correct in his assertion that he was unconstitutionally excluded,
the Court might refuse to overturn the determination of the House on that issue.
When faced with this problem, state courts have refused to assume jurisdiction.
Danielson v. Fitzsimmons, 232 Minn. 149, 44 N.W.2d 484 (1950); State v. Zimmer-
man, 249 Wis. 237, 24 N.W.2d 504 (1946).
102 IND. ANN. STAT. §29-5713 (Supp. 1966); MD. ANN. CODE art 33, § 230(d)
(1957); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211.37 (1962); N.J. STAT. ANN. §19:3-13 (1964);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit 25, § 3232 (1963); UTAH CODE ANN. §20-14-42(2) (1953);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 12.24(2) (1957). Cf. NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-1115 (1960) (legis-
lature to decide its election contests).
1967l
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members, 3 and it is unlikely that the state legislatures are more
diligent.
To say that there are inherent difficulties in regulating political
finance is not to say that there cannot be an effective statutory scheme.
The answer involves the intelligent drafting of statutes and the use
of innovations already developed by some states.
III. THE PROPOSALS
Regulation of political finance has three aims: limiting the amount
spent; controlling the collection and disbursement of that money; and
informing the voter of how the money was raised and spent. The first
goal, limiting the amount spent in campaigns, was probably unenforce-
able and unrealistic from the beginning. The arguments against it are
both theoretical and practical. The limitations are clearly arbitrary and
bear little or no relation to actual campaign costs.' 4 Placing an
artificial ceiling on spending makes regulation more difficult, because
it forces a decentralization of authority and creates strong pressures
to falsify the reports filed under the disclosure laws.'0 5  On the
theoretical level, the ceilings attempt to limit the candidate's ability
to reach the public and as such are in direct conflict with an electoral
process that depends upon an informed voter. Moreover, there are
constitutional problems which probably prevent a ceiling from being
imposed on the amount that all persons could spend on behalf of a
candidate. 6 Experience has shown that the laws attempting to limit
the amount spent in a campaign are unworkable, 10 7 even if they are
well drafted, which they are not. Consequently, it is apparent that
this type of statute should be repealed.
Eliminating the restrictions on campaign expenditures, however,
does not mean that the goals of these statutes should be abandoned.
Originally ceilings were enacted to prevent politics from being
dominated by economic interests. One alternative to limitations is to
103 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep., Jan. 21, 1966, p. 59.
104 Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:39-2 (1964) (governor limited to $100,000
for the general election) with N.Y. PEN. LAW § 781 (1) (governor limited to $20,000).
Not only do the two neighboring states have radically different ceilings, but the
spending of the candidates exceeds these limitations. For example, it has been esti-
mated that Governor Rockefeller spent $4,500,000 in his successful bid for another
term. Newsweek, Oct. 31, 1966, p. 36.
-05 HEARD, THE COSTS OF DEMoCRACY 353-55, 368 (1960).
106 If only a limited amount is to be spent by all groups supporting a candidate,
inevitably there will be someone or some group which will not be able to express
its opinion because others have already spent the allotted amount. This restriction
probably violates the first amendment. See Note, 66 HAuv. L. REV. 1259, 1266-67
(1953). Without some control over the aggregate expenditures, individual limitations
on groups or candidates lose their effectiveness because they can be evaded by increas-
ing the number of committees. Therefore, in reality, there can be no effective control
over the total amount spent in a campaign.
107A presidential commission found the limitations unworkable. ALEXANDER &
DENNY, REGULATION OF POLrrICAL FINANCE 10 (1966). This opinion is shared by
several states which have repealed their limitations in recent years. See HEARD, THE
COSTS OF DEMOCRACY 351 n.2 1 (1960).
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provide a government subsidy to political parties. Such a system has
been working for some time in Puerto Rico,' and a variation of this
approach was recently suggested in Congress.' 0 The availability of
government money to finance political activity naturally reduces the
dependence of candidates on other sources of funds and would accom-
plish what the limitations unsuccessfully attempted-to free politics
from the monied interests11O
The second group of laws are those which require the candidate
or committee treasurer to observe certain accounting procedures, re-
strict the sources of funds and the number of people who handle the
money and prohibit certain types of disbursements."' Limiting the
number of people with access to the money obviously reduces the op-
portunities for malfeasance and makes it easier to expose violations.
No theoretical problems are presented here; it is just a matter of en-
acting legislation which centralizes financial matters in a few persons
who are accountable." Such laws, of course, are effective only if
there are independent means of checking the records of the candidates
and committees. Four states provide such a check by requiring candi-
dates to funnel their funds through a particular bank." 8 Legislation
requiring depositories is an essential part of any regulatory scheme,
not only because it would bring some order to the financial affairs of
minor candidates, but also because the records maintained by the
bank furnish a check on the candidate's own books and on the reports
filed under the disclosure statutes.
Depositories are not the final answer for they only provide in-
formation about funds actually deposited in the bank. To uncover the
amount contributed but not deposited, it is suggested that the states
grant a deduction in their state income taxes for any contributions to
political parties or candidates." 4  Such a provision would serve the
1o8 P.R. LAws ANN. §§ 16.601-09 (Supp. 1966).
109 See Pub. L. No. 809, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 301-05 (Nov. 13, 1966), which
permits each taxpayer to designate $1.00 be paid into the Presidential Election Cam-
paign Fund, which is then distributed in varying proportions to political parties that
poll over 5,000,000 votes. The Senate, however, recently voted to repeal this legis-
lation and it is unlikely that comparable legislation will be reenacted this year. New
York Times, April 14, 1967, p. 1, col. 1. See also note 117 infra and accompanying
text.
11O The effectiveness of any government subsidy in freeing politics from monied
interests depends upon the number of state and federal offices covered and the amount
of the subsidy for each office. If a subsidy was in effect in 1964, it would have cost
$200 million dollars to finance the elections held for all state and federal offices.
U.S. News & World Report, Nov. 9, 1964, p. 41.
111 See text accompanying notes 51-59 spra.
112 Part of this goal can be realized by repealing the limitations on campaign
expenditures, which will remove the principal reason for the increasing number of
committees and should result in a centralization of authority in campaign finance.
113 See note 60 supra.
114One state already has legislation which permits deductions up to $1000 for
contributions to political parties. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.21.3(e) (Supp. 1966).
See also, Lobel, Federal Control of Campaign Contributions, 51 MINN. L. REv. 1,
50-60 (1966) for some proposals for federal action in this area. This suggestion
can be implemented on the state level only in those states which have an income tax.
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twofold purpose of encouraging individual contributions and providing
information on the amount actually contributed. The tax deduction
combined with the depository would enable enforcement officials to
trace contributions from the donor to the ultimate payee. Such a
system is not foolproof-some contributors might not claim their
deductions and some candidates might not deposit the money in the
depositories-but the amount that would escape detection would be
far less than under existing law.
The third major aim of existing legislation is to inform the voters
of the sources of campaign funds and of what these contributions
actually purchase. Without this type of legislation, any regulation of
political finance loses its impact because candidates do not have to
consider public opinion in arranging for and spending their funds,
and enforcement is left to the inadequate processes authorized by law.
Most of the difficulties with these statutes revolve around poor
drafting. To be effective disclosure statutes should require all candi-
dates and all committees to report all of their contributions and
expenditures. These reports should be filed and published periodically
throughout the election year so that the electorate can be continually
informed of the basis of a candidate's financial support. These sug-
gestions are obvious but have been ignored by legislatures," 5 and the
result has been ineffective regulation.
Besides the drafting problem, existing legislation has failed to
provide an adequate means of reviewing the data in the financial reports.
As a result this information is unreliable or is hidden within the
bureaucracy and is therefore useless. To insure that the reports filed
under the disclosure statutes actually disclose correct information to
the public, an independent agency should be created in each state to
receive and audit the financial reports and to investigate suspected
violations. With access to all of the relevant information contained
in the financial reports, the data supplied by the bank depositories
and the claims for tax deductions for contributions, the agency would
be able to provide the public with an accurate account of any candidate's
financial status. Moreover, the correlation of this data would uncover
discrepancies which would lead to further investigations and possible
prosecutions." 6
Because an agency is so essential to effective regulation, it is
necessary to insure that it is beyond political pressure. Thus, it should
be an independent body staffed by permanent civil servants,1 7 and care
should be taken to select top administrators who are not closely iden-
tified with partisan politics. With such protection from the political
:15 See text accompanying notes 24-39 supra
116 Modern data processing procedures would enable the agency to tabulate all
of this material, discover errors and print the reports in a relatively short time. Cf.,
Meet the "Monster" That Checks Your Tax Return, Reader's Digest, Jan. 1967, p. 177.
117 Compare Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 123.055, .061 (Supp. 1967) with ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. ch. 21, § 1399 (1965).
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winds, the agency could operate without fear of reprisal. The mere
knowledge that the agency examines all of the reports would be a
great deterrent to illegal financial deals. while at the same time the
agency would be providing the voter with a complete picture of every
candidate's financial support.
The extent to which a central reporting agency will deter illegal
transactions is probably limited since deterrence depends upon the
electorate's exercising its disapproval of such transactions at the polls,
and the public forgets easily and forgives much. Effective deterrence
can be established only through strong enforcement of the laws in
legal proceedings. Unfortunately, this has been the greatest failure
of present law. The reasons for this are clear. It is difficult to uncover
violations amid the numerous transactions, and more difficult to prove
them in court. Secondly, political considerations often cut against
any prosecution regardless of the party of the defendant. The first
problem can largely be solved by the institution of an independent
agency to review the campaign finance reports. The problem of politi-
cal pressure against prosecutions is much more serious because enforce-
ment and prosecution officers, in general, are also elected individuals
and hence reluctant to prosecute members of their own party, or even
members of the opposing party, for fear of reprisal.
The solution rests with the creation of a means of enforcing the
statutes outside the normal enforcement channels. Several states
now authorize their citizens to initiate proceedings by petitioning the
prosecuting attorney, the courts or other investigatory bodies." 8  Such
procedures are inadequate because enforcement officials still exercise
considerable discretion in deciding whether to prosecute. Other states
require the prosecuting attorney to bring suit or forfeit his office,"'
but these provisions are also ineffective because they force the citizen
to bring legal action and spend money to prod the prosecuting attorney
into doing his job. A few states now permit the citizen to by-pass the
normal enforcement channels and prosecute the suit himself if the
district attorney fails to act.'" The difficulty with this type of statute
is that few voters have the time and the financial resources to begin
a crusade against questionable financial transactions in political cam-
paigns. Consequently, under state law today prosecutions are solely
within the discretion of state officials, and private rights of action are
largely illusory because of the high cost involved.
A similar problem faced the drafters of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.121 The aim there was to prevent officers and directors
118 See notes 72-78 supra and accompanying text.
111D MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 211.33 (1962); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-1462
(1947) ; OKrA. STAT. ANN. fit. 26, § 420 (1955) ; OR. REv. STAT. § 260.480 (1965).
120 MiNx. STAT. ANN. § 211.33 (1962); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 129.160 (1966) (au-
thorizes suit by candidate with second highest vote); Nn . REV. STAT. § 32-1109
(1960).
12148 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-hh (1964).
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of corporations from making short swing profits in the stock market
by using information about their enterprises which was not available
to the investing public. The number of such transactions prevented
the use of normal enforcement procedures, and fellow directors and
officers were reluctant to bring suit against their colleagues.. The solu-
tion, section 16 of the act, was to force the corporate officials to disclose
their stock dealings and then to grant the stockholder the right to sue
in the name of the corporation.'22 If the stockholder prevailed, he
could be reimbursed from the amount recovered from the illegal trans-
action.
113
Legislation similar in theory to section 16 of the Securities Ex-
change Act could be implemented to solve the enforcement problem in
political finance. Thus each voter should be able to bring a private right
of action against the parties involved in illegal financial transactions. 4
The concept of the private prosecutor 25 bypasses the great potential
for delay that exists in the present legislative scheme and in alternative
methods of enforcement, such as provisions for mandamus to compel
the district attorney to prosecute. The other disadvantage of existing
enforcement machinery is that the financial burden of bringing the suit
rests upon the individual voter. To remedy this defect some provision
for reimbursement of plaintiff's legitimate expenses should be made. 2
The proper solution to this problem, however, rests upon a balancing
of two conflicting interests-the need to encourage private enforcement
versus the danger of harassment to candidates and elected officials.
Either payment of all the plaintiff's expenses in all cases, or the exist-
ing system, whereby the individual assumes all of the cost of the suit,
have obvious shortcomings; the former because it does not discourage
frivolous suits, and the latter because it discourages too many suits.
Between these two extremes are many possibilities; however, two
proposals present the best balancing of interests. One possibility would
be to reimburse the plaintiff for all of his legitimate expenses if he
proves a violation of the campaign finance laws. Under this proposal,
the plaintiff can never profit by bringing suit, and he may incur ex-
penses if he fails to prove his case. However, for two reasons, the
lack of monetary gain may not affect the number of suits brought.
First, the basic reason for bringing these actions may not be monetary
48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
. The stockholder's right to recover his legal expenses arises because he has
given a benefit to the corporation, and not as a result of the federal securities legis-
lation. See 13 FLsrCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONs § 6045 (rev. ed. 1943); LATTIN,
CORPORATIONS 381-84 (1959).
124 This cause of action would differ from civil liability imposed under the Texas
and California statutes. See note 91 mpra.
125 For other examples of the private prosecutor concept see Note, 65 YALE
L.J. 218-29 (1955).
126 Legitimate expenses include all lawyer's fees, court costs and other expendi-
tures incidental to any court action, and may be expanded to cover expenditures
incurred in uncovering suspected violations.
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but rather altruistic or, perhaps more basically, vengeance. Second,
repayment of legal expenses for successful prosecution is analogous
to the contingent fee, and thus provides lawyers with an interest or
incentive to litigate this type of case. 27
A second proposal would include repayment of expenses along
with a monetary recovery which would act as an additional incentive
to bring the suit, and would balance the risk of incurring legal expenses
if the case is not proved. 2 ' This suggestion, of course, will promote
more litigation than the first proposal. However, both are reasonable
solutions, and the choice between them depends upon the legislature's
balancing the need for encouraging these suits against the danger of
harassment.
Once it has been established that some method of repayment should
be provided, the question remains what should be the source of these
funds. The easiest and perhaps most just solution would be to make
the defendant civilly liable for the plaintiff's expenses. Thus if a
violation is proved, the defendant should be liable for an amount equal
to the unreported or misappropriated campaign funds.'29 If the recov-
ery is not adequate, the state should pay the plaintiff's costs because
it was the state's inaction that caused him to incur the expenses. If
the recovery exceeds the legitimate expenses of the plaintiff, the excess
could be distributed pro rata to all contributors to the campaign or put
into a general state account to pay for future litigation. This right
of action should be available only after the prosecuting attorney has
refused to bring the suit, since this legislation is not intended to
supplant existing enforcement machinery, but rather to be an alternative
method of enforcement should the normal means be blocked.'
Naturally there should be some statutory protection for politicians
against suits instituted solely for harassment purposes. A few states
which already have some private enforcement provisions require the
plaintiff to post bond before bringing the action,'" and the require-
ment of a reasonable bond should be retained. To avoid the use of
a threat of suit to coerce a settlement, the law should require that all
127 Providing lawyers with material incentives to bring these suits may raise
ethical problems concerning champerty. See A.B.A. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS, Canons 27, 28. In this situation, as with section 16 of the Securities Ex-
change Act, the benefit of encouraging this litigation outweighs the ethical con-
siderations.
=The additional recovery accruing to the successful plaintiff may either be a
fixed sum, see CAL ELEcTioN CODE §§ 11890-91, or a percentage of the misappropriated
campaign funds.
M3 If violations do not involve misuses of campaign funds, liability would be
limited to a flat sum or just to the plaintiff's legal fees.
330 Cf. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 48 Stat 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C.
78p(b) (1964).
131 MD. ANN. CODE art 33, § 230(b) (1957) (court to determine the amount of
the bond) ; Mo. STAT. ANN. § 129.140 (1966) ($1000 bond required) ; N.Y. ELcrION
LAW § 334(4) (court determines the amount of the bond).
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settlements be approved by the court. 3 2  Thus, a private right of
action, carefully circumscribed to prevent harassment, would provide
a solution to the problem created by enforcement officials who are
reluctant to prosecute for political reasons.
Still to be discussed is the problem of sanctions. Present law
makes it difficult to convict a candidate for violating the campaign
finance laws. This is the result of several factors-the reluctance to
prosecute a prominent and powerful citizen, the unwillingness to hold
a candidate responsible for transactions beyond his control, and the
undesirability of removing from office a person for whom the majority
has voted. The last two considerations are valid and justify limiting
the circumstances under which an elected official can be ousted from
office. At the same time there is no reason to insulate them from
liability solely because of their position. Hence, statutes punishing
candidates for knowing violations of the law. including diversion of
campaign funds to personal use, should be retained.
Once a candidate or elected official is convicted, there remains the
question of whether he should forfeit his office. Many states have
such a requirement, but several leave the disciplining to their respec-
tive legislative bodies because of the constitutional command that these
bodies should be the judge of their own elections. 38 Experience on
the federal level shows that this approach nullifies these laws as applied
to succesful candidates because legislators are reluctant to disclipine
their own members.' Even if a private citizen contests an election
in a legislature or Congress,'35 the proceedings are often subject to
partisan pressures.'36 Although a legislature judges its own elections
(subject to an undetermined amount of judicial review),"' this does
not mean that a state's action does not have any impact on that deci-
sion. The mere fact that a state certifies one candidate rather than
another gives the former individual an advantage because the burden
then rests upon someone else to unseat him. Secondly, a legislature
would be reluctant to disturb the state's decision on certification because
they would then be seating an individual convicted of violating the
the election law. As for congressional elections, while each house of
the national legislature has control over the seating of its members
under the Constitution, 38 Congress has given effect to state statutes
132 Cf. FFa. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
133 See note 101 supra.
134 The recent exclusion from Congress of Adam Clayton Powell indicates that
legislative bodies are reluctant to take any action without heavy public pressure.
See generally Cong. Q. Weekly Report, Mar. 10, 1967, p. 345.
135 See REv. STAT. §§ 105-30 (1875), as amended, 2 U.S.C. §§ 201-26 (1964).
See also NFa. REv. STAT. §§ 32-1115, 1103-04 (1960).
136 Barnett, Contested Congressional Elections in Recent Years, 54 POL. Sci. Q.
187, 207-08 (1939). See also, Sen. Comm. on Rules and Administration, Senate
Election, Expulsion and Censure Cases, S. Doc. 71, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
137 See note 101 supra.
138 Ibid.
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when legislating in the election area. For example, the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act specifically provides that state rather than federal limita-
tions on campaign expenditures are controlling. 9 All of these con-
siderations are subtle pressures on a legislative body to accept the
man the state has certified. While this pressure may be outweighed
by partisan considerations, it is unlikely.14
Forfeiture statutes are only effective against successful candidates.
Defeated individiuals are subject only to the normal criminal sanctions,
all of which have defects in the political context. To supplement
existing law there should be legislation prohibiting those who have
been convicted of violating the campaign finance laws from holding
any elective, appointive or party office for periods varying with the
seriousness of the offense. Although some states have this type of
legislation,' 4 ' its deterrent effect has not been recognized, and it has
remained a secondary sanction. Any legislative revision should reverse
this emphasis. Exiling an individual from political life removes the
candidate or official from the political scene and substantially reduces
his influence without resorting to a criminal trial and subsequent im-
prisonment. This type of sanction is also effective against campaign
workers who might be tempted to break the law, for it removes any
possibility of reward from the party, and the blot on the worker's
record considerably reduces his political future. No set of sanctions
is ever wholly effective, but the addition of the possibility of political
exile completes a balanced set of punishments: fines for minor viola-
tions, political exile for more serious misdeeds and criminal penalties
for actions that are criminal in nonpolitical contexts.
As this survey of campaign finance laws indicates all too clearly,
there is much that is wrong with the present statutory scheme-the
failure to draft comprehensive laws, the carefully drafted exceptions
that swallow the rule and the lack of enforcement machinery. All
of these defects and many more are obvious when the operation of
these laws is examined. But it is an easy thing to criticize and a
much more difficult task to revise the laws to silence the criticism.
Revision always requires facing and solving problems which were
ignored before and those which will arise in the future. Recognizing
the precarious nature of the endeavor, some suggestions are offered.
To make political finance laws consistent with elective politics as
practiced today, the ceilings on campaign expenditures should be
removed. To prevent misappropriation and misuse of campaign funds,
a combination of internal financial checks, such as the campaign deposi-
13943 Stat. 1073 (1925), 2 U.S.C. §248(b) (1964). See also, 43 Stat. 1074
(1925), 2 U.S.C. § 254 (1964), which provides that federal law is not to be construed
so as to annul any state law unless directly inconsistent with it.
14o In the past 20 years no senator certified by his state has been unseated in
an election contest Sen. Comm. on Rules and Administration, Senate Election,
Expulsion and Cenntre Cases, S. Doc. 71, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 134-54 (1962).
141 See notes 86-88 supra and accompanying text.
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tory and the disclosure statutes, and an independent agency to receive,
audit and publish all the information about the financial dealings of
politicians should be established. To insure effective enforcement of
these laws, there should be created a private right of action in each
citizen to act if the prosecuting attorney fails to do so. To provide
an effective sanction and add deterrence to the law, provision for
prohibiting those who have been convicted of violating the campaign
finance statutes from participating in politics should be enacted and
employed. These suggestions are not complete solutions and perhaps
not even workable ones; they are in fact only proposals. The gap
between proposals and law is bridged by the legislative process, and
it is here that the task is most difficult, for the enthusiasm for change
must be generated and maintained by the very people on whom the
weight of the legislation must fall. If the apathy, indifference and
open hostility which now surround campaign finance regulation can be
overcome, these laws may be rescued from the political limbo where
they now reside.
